



# Chinas Industriepolitik: Von De-Risking bis zur Transformation der Chemie

Webinar hosted by Dr. Matthias Blum, Abteilungsleitung Außenwirtschaft, Außenwirtschaftspolitik, europäische/nationale Industriepolitik, VCI

**14<sup>th</sup> August 2024** 

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China Macro Group (CMG)

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# China Macro Group (CMG) – a specialized research-based European consultancy focused on China



### **Profile**

- CMG is an agile, diverse and partnership-led European boutique consulting with specialization in applied China research and analysis
- CMG serves European MNCs,
   SMEs, the public sector as well as investors
- It focuses on China's policy, market and China-related international affairs
- CMG operates with offices in Zurich, Munich and Beijing

### **Key expertise areas**



## **Economic policies and market reforms**

SOE reform, market access, SSSR, tax system

# Financial system, market and policies

• Financial opening-up, Green Finance, FinTech

### Industrial, S&T and talent policies

• Guidance funds, MIC25, int. S&T cooperation

### Trade and foreign (economic) policies

• RCEP/CPTPP, trade promotion, Belt-and-Road

### Social and environmental policies

Silver economy, Hukou reform, carbon trading

## Our approach

Fact-based, rigorous and in-depth research and analysis

Interdisciplinary and crosscultural team

On-the-ground presence and engagement with Chinese experts

China competency at the core: language, economic/political system, historic context




























# Questions European firms investigate with CMG in China's market and policy-driven environment
























# **Flagship publication: CMG Primers**

Understanding process and key outcomes of China's 20th Party Congress



Chinese government remodeled at the Two Sessions 2023 – policy, people and structure

Understanding supply chain distortions of critical minerals powering the green energy transition

EU-China relations – from economic integration to EU's strategic autonomy and 'de-risking'







Understanding the "Taiwan issue"







Sino-Swiss – from honing a "special relationship" to balancing new geopolitical complexities



Understanding process and influencing factors of Taiwan's 2024 presidential election



Two Sessions 2024 – Strengthening proactive and better coordinated economic policy



China's risk management – 'Coordinate development and security'



New EUCCC-CMG report "Riskful thinking – navigating the politics of economic security"





# Recent publication: EUCCC-CMG report "Riskful thinking – navigating the politics of economic security"















## **CMG webinars**: "Staying in dialogue with China" webinar series, 2024 edition



5th April, 2024 9-945am CET | 3-345pm CST Economic Transition and Industrial Upgrading



11 September 2024
9-945am CET | 3-345pm CST
Social Rebalancing and Market Governance

LI Shi, Dean of Institute for Common Prosperity and



**WANG Yong**, Academic Deputy Dean of the Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking University





23rd October, 2024 9-945am CET | 3-345pm CST Economic Globalization

Development, Zhejiang University



**LU Feng**, Emeritus Professor of Economics and former Deputy Dean of the National School of Development, Peking University



**YU Miaojie**, President and University Chair Professor of Liaoning University, and Liberal-Art Chair Professor of Peking University



19th June 2024 9-945am CET | 3-345pm CST Economic Security

9-945am CET | 3-345pm CST

**Market-oriented Reforms** 



**WANG Zhengxu**, Professor at Department of Political Science, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University



TBC 9-945am CET | 3-345pm CST 'Domestic Demand System'




**HUANG Yiping**, Sinar Mas Chair Professor of Finance/Economics, Dean National School of Development, Peking University

CET: Central European Time | CST: China Standard Time



# <u>Thought leadership publication example</u>: Corporate strategy-making in China – six building blocks





# CMG curation: example of 4-day China Europe-China business conference in Shenzhen (22-25 Oct. 2023)

# stars China symposium 2023 (22-25 Oct) – curated, run and moderated by CMG in China's dynamic Shenzhen





# Agenda

1	Broader policy context: 14th Five-Year-Plan (2021-2025) as "strategic shift"	5'
2	<ul> <li>Evolving industrial policy factors for FIEs in China's business environment</li> <li>20<sup>th</sup> CC 'Third Plenum' (July 2024)</li> <li>China's "de-risking"</li> <li>Industrial policy blueprint for chemicals sector under 'High-Quality Development'</li> </ul>	25′
3	How foreign chemical MNCs in China respond to evolved environment	5′
	Discussion / Q&A	20'



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# Key factors influencing 14th FYP drafting and lessons from Covid pandemic prepare ground for "strategic shift"

### Key contextual factors in 2020



### Geopolitics

 «US containment and suppression as a big threat»



### State of China's development

- 1<sup>st</sup> centennial goal
- Development challenges



### 19th Party Congress


- "Change of principal contradiction in society"
- "New era" (= state/issue)
- High-Quality-Development (= solution)



#### Governance

- "Centralized and unified leadership" (集中统一领导)
- Abolition of constitutional term limit (2018)

### Reflections after initial containment of pandemic



From Xi's speech in the 7<sup>th</sup> meeting of the CCP Commission on Economy & Finance on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2020

### **Doubling down**

- "Super-sized market"
- "Complete industrial system" (完备的产业体系)
- "Trump card" tech/industry (as deterrence to de-coupling)

### Security needs

Data, energy, food, supply chains, military capabilities

### 'Self-reliance'

- Addressing "bottleneck technologies"
- "Secure industrial and supply chains"
- "Self-circulation" (自我循环), in extreme cases

# China's 14th Five-Year-Plan is seen as of historic importance and 'strategic shift'






LI Junru

Former Vice-President of the Central Party School, in an interview with China News Service's "China focus face to face" (中国焦点面对面) on 26<sup>th</sup> October 2020

«The core of the [14th Five-year] plan is to realize the **biggest strategic shift** since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee [in 1978] and the establishment of a market economy system. [...]

《规划核心要义就是实现(十一届)三中全会以来、建立市场经济体制以来**最大 的一个战略转移**》

# 14th Five-Year-Plan: deviating from prior trajectories – shaped by geopolitics, pandemic and 1st centennial goal



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Economic policy

Social policy

Security/governance

FYP goals/governance



# **Political economy**: China's pursuit of 'high quality development' taking place amid six structural transitions

Key structural transitions	Key policy goals	Key issues	Key policies
Economic transition and industrial upgrading	<ul> <li>Transition to innovation-based economy</li> <li>Climb industrial value chain</li> <li>Digitalization and decarbonization</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Service sector contribution to GDP low</li> <li>Manufacturing struggling at mid-end products, low industrial value-added</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Made-in-China 2025</li> <li>Opinions on High-quality Development of Service Industry 2019</li> <li>14<sup>th</sup> FYP 2021 Ch. 8, 10.</li> </ul>
Market-oriented reforms and market governance	<ul> <li>Institutional transition, factor liberalization, SOE reform and "SSSR"</li> <li>Socialist market governance incl. antimonopoly, / 'social credit'</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Low TFP</li> <li>Lower efficiency of state capital</li> <li>Monopolies and overcapacity</li> <li>"Disorderly expansion of capital"</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Building Market-Oriented System for Allocation of Factors 2020</li> <li>14<sup>th</sup> FYP 2021 Ch. 19-22.</li> </ul>
Economic globalization	<ul> <li>Integration into global flow of goods, services, capital, talent and ideas</li> <li>Continued opening-up</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Comparatively weak trade of service</li><li>Comparatively low outbound FDI stock</li><li>Geopolitics and decoupling policies</li></ul>	<ul> <li>14<sup>th</sup> FYP 2021 Ch. 40</li> <li>Opinion on Increasing Efforts to Attract Foreign Investment 2023</li> </ul>
"Domestic demand system"	<ul><li>Consumption-boosting policies</li><li>Rebalancing of public investments</li><li>Business environment policy</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Low consumption share to GDP</li> <li>Demographic shift to aging population</li> <li>Imperfect social security system</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>14th FYP 2021 Ch. 12-14.</li> <li>Strategic Plan for Fully Expanding Domestic Demand 2022</li> </ul>
Social rebalancing	<ul><li>Equality and poverty reduction</li><li>Social fairness and protection</li><li>Balanced regional development</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Inequality: top 1% holds 30% of wealth</li> <li>Vulnerability of social groups (e.g. youth)</li> </ul>	• 14 <sup>th</sup> FYP 2021 Ch. 23-32.
Economic security	"Coordinate development and security"	<ul><li>Import dependencies and perceived supply chain risks</li><li>China's weaker geoeconomic power</li></ul>	• 14 <sup>th</sup> FYP 2021 Ch. 41-42, 52-53




Trade-off / rebalancing processes

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# Recap China's 'party-state': Central Committee (CC) is biggest regularly convening senior party body



# The CC holds 7 plenary meetings in each 5-year term, focused on top-level decisions on party and state affairs

### **Central Committee (CC)**

(205 members + 171 alternate members)

... customarily holding 7 plenary meeting during a 5-year term

## 1<sup>st</sup> plenum

Decide CCP's leadership

#### 2<sup>nd</sup> plenum

Decide central gov's leadership

### 3<sup>rd</sup> plenum

Define mid-term economic and social reform goals

### 4<sup>th</sup> plenum

Implement 3rd plenum policy, other critical issues

### 5<sup>th</sup> plenum


Evaluate social and econ development, initiate new FYPs

#### 6th plenum

Steer ideological setting and party building

#### 7<sup>th</sup> plenum

Prepare next CCP **National Congress** 





Elected members of politburo and its standing committee, as well as the head of CCP 'General Secretary'

18th CC 2nd plenum



- Nominated central gov leaders Approved State
- Council's institutional reform plan

18th CC 3rd plenum



Initiated a midterm plan to comprehensively deepen reform

18<sup>th</sup> CC 4th plenum



Initiated a plan to compressively promote lawbased governance



 Reviewed and approved the draft of 13<sup>th</sup> national 'Five-year plan'

18th CC 6th plenum



 Introduced and amended party rules, with a focus on strict discipline and supervision

18th CC 7th plenum



 Reviewed the achievements made in last 5 years and prepared for 19th Party Congress



18th CC reference

Customary focus of plenary meeting,

## Reviewing past Third Plena: 1978 and 1993 seen as historically most important in shaping China's development

11th CC Third Plenum (December 1978)



12th CC Third Plenum (October 1984)



14th CC Third Plenum (November 1993)



16th CC Third Plenum (October 2003)



18th CC Third Plenum (November 2013)



**Party** leadership

Led by Deng Xiaoping

Led by Deng Xiaoping

Chaired by Jiang Zemin

Chaired by Hu Jintao



# **Key policy**

contribution

- Start reforms in rural area by replacing 'collective farming' with 'household contract', stimulated food production
- Made firm decisions to proceed economic institutional reforms
- Guidance: multi-type (多种形式) economy and opening-up
- Set framework of building a 'socialist market economy', with market playing a "fundamental" role in resource allocation
- Set goals to further improve the 'socialist market economy'
- Stressed mixedownership, property right protection, etc.

Chaired by Xi Jinping

forces and government

function, while market

is given a "decisive"

role in resource

allocation

Coordinate market

- **Significant** outcome(s)
- CCP's working focus shift from 'class struggle' to 'socialist modernization'
- China's shift towards economic reform and opening-up
- Reforms promoted nationwide with focus shifting from rural to urban areas
- After a decade of deliberation inside China, this plenum solidified the ideological and policy foundation for such market reforms
- Follow-through to enhance the building of China's 'socialist market economy'
- Broadened and deepened reforms to liberalize economy, strengthen rule of law and improve social welfare

Importance in **CCP** perception today












# Pre-'Third Plenum': 'document drafting group' led by Xi over period of 8 months – various consultations



Nov. 2023 onwards



Nov. 27, 2023 - Dec. 7, 2023



Dec. 8, 2023 - May 6, 2023



May 7, 2024 – July 2024

July 15, 2024

Set up the "Third Plenum Document Drafting Group" (文件起草组)

Politburo decided to set up the "Third Planum Document Drafting Group", and Xi Jinping personally acted as the "group leader" of the Drafting Group; Wang Huning, Cai Qi and Ding Xuexiang serve as "deputy group leaders" Consultations and deliberations – 1<sup>st</sup> round

Local governments and "some cadres and general population" were consulted to gather opinions on the general topic, framework, and important measures of the 'Third Plenum' and "the resolution" (决定)\*

First meeting of "Third Plenum Document Drafting Group"

The first plenary meeting of the "Third Plenum Document Drafting Group" was help on Dec. 8, 2023, marking the official kick-off of document drafting and preparation of the 'Third Plenum'

Consultations and deliberations – 2<sup>nd</sup> round

The drafts of 'Third Plenum' documents were sent to "a certain range within the Party, leaders of other parties, All-China Chamber of Industry and Commerce, non-partisan persons, companies, experts and scholars", and gathered 1911 suggestions, 221 changes were made accordingly

>> Start of 'Third Plenum'

>> During this drafting process, the PBSC held 3 meetings and Politburo 2 meetings to review and revise 'Third Plenum' documents

<sup>&#</sup>x27; Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization (中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化的决定)



# Key events of 4-days lasting 'Third Plenum' - followed by press conference and Politburo meeting



Xi Jinping, followed by Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, etc. entered the **Opening Ceremony** 



**199** CC members, **165** CC alternate members, and **around 140** other party members attended the Plenum



Xi Jinping made a speech on **"the explanation"** (说明) of the draft of "**the resolution**" (决定)



Attendees were **divided into 10 groups** to discuss "the resolution", give their opinions and suggestions



Attendees of 'Third Plenum' **formally passed** the final version of "the resolution" (决定) by raising hands



Vote to accept Qin Gang's resignation, confirm to expel 3 PLA generals Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao, Sun Jinming



Press Conference of CC post-'Third Plenum' on July 19<sup>th</sup> by six ministerlevel policy makers

中共中央政治局召开会议
分析研究当前经济形势和经济工作
审议《整治形式主义为基层减负若干规定》中共中央总书记习近平主持会议
会议认为,今年以来,在以习近平同志为核心的
党中央坚强领导下,各地区各部门迎难而上、积极作为,深化改革开放,加强宏观调控,有效应对风险挑战,经济运行总体平稳、稳中有进,延续回升向好态

Politburo meeting on July 30<sup>th</sup> to plan 2<sup>nd</sup> half year 2024 economic activities, guided by 'Third Plenum'

Note: CC: Central Committee

# **Governance concepts: 'Third Plenum' doubles use of 'mechanisms/procedures' showing focus on effectiveness**

### Chinese reforms address three governance levels

### Fundamental system / rule (制度)

**1** 

 Broadest governance term used in Chinese policymaking, focusing on abstract rules, principles and systems
 E.g. Socialist System (社会主义制度)

### Organization / functional framework (体制)




 Refers to organizations or functional frameworks that operate within/under a 'fundamental system' or 'rule'
 E.g. Socialist Market Economy System (社会主义市场经济体制)

### Mechanism / procedure (机制)



- Most granular governance level, focusing on functioning and effectiveness of organizations / functional frameworks
   E.g. Data Cross-border Flow Mechanism (数据跨境流动机制)
- Governance concept of 'system' (体系) used inconsistently: sometimes narrowly and functionally (e.g., 民营企业信用评价体系, POE Credit Evaluation System) and sometimes more abstractly as a set of mechanisms / procedures (e.g., 国家治理体系, National Governance System)
- Thus, this governance concept is not considered in this analysis


### **Keyword frequency analysis of key Chinese governance terms**



# Policymaking verbs: Third Plenum's key policymaking verbs indicate focus on 'follow-through' and 'completion'


### Frequency of 19 key policymaking verbs across 3 life-cycle categories

18th CC Third Plenum vs. 20th CC Third Plenum



Note: one-to-one mapping of 3 categories and 19 key policymaking verbs in next backup slide


### Deep-dive: frequency of 19 key policymaking verbs





# Actors/levers: keyword analysis reveals more emphasis on topics such as talent, finance, industry & technology

### Keyword frequency analyses: 18th CC Third Plenum vs. 20th CC Third Plenum



(industry / sector)

(science)

(technology)

(industry /

manufacturing)

(foreign capital)

(capital)


(market)

(finance)

(company)

(manufacturing)

# Baseline analysis: in "explanation" (说明), Xi assesses key internal and external factors faced by China today



Xi Jinping speaking at the 20<sup>th</sup> CC Third Plenum

In the "explanation" (说明), he stated in the beginning of the document considerations, internal and external factors constituting where China stands now

Xi's "explanation" addresses a series of internal factors...

#### There's a need to improve China's socialist system

- China's socialist system is not perfect, and it's a "dynamic process" to improve the socialist system and adapt to new changes
- With this dynamic improvement, CN can transform its institutional advantages (制度优势) to effectiveness of governance

#### China's current development is unbalanced and inadequate

- The **Principal Contradiction** (主要矛盾) facing the Chinese society today has changed
- China's current status of development is unbalanced and inadequate (发展不平衡不充分)

#### China faces nine key development issues

- Xi Jinping listed **nine key development issues** China faces today:
  - 1) market system not robust and not fully developed
  - 2) relation between government and market not yet sorted out
  - 3) innovation capabilities not yet sound
  - 4) industrial system "big but not strong, complete but not refined" (大而不强、全而不精)
  - 5) bottleneck technologies
  - 6) agricultural foundation not strong enough
  - 7) urban / rural / regional imbalance
  - 8) social security still has shortcomings
  - 9) **environmental** problems still not fully solved

... and diagnoses a worsened external environment

#### The world is undergoing major changes unseen in a century

- China face "major changes unseen in a century" (百年未有之大变局), and these changes are "accelerating their evolution"
- Frequent regional conflicts and unrest, with increasing global problems taking place around the world

#### More suppression and containment from outside

- The "**suppression and containment**" (打压遏制) from the outside world continues to escalate
- There are increasing uncertainties, with "black swan" (黑天鹅) and "grey rhino" (灰犀牛) events possibly occurring at any time

#### Opportunities, risks and challenges co-exist

- China is in a time that "strategic opportunities, risks and challenges coexist" (战略机遇和风险挑战并存)
- China needs to further deepen reforms, using its sound systems to prevent and resolve risks, eventually "creating new opportunities among crises, and opening up new prospects among changes" (在 危机中育新机、干变局中开新局)

Note: words in "x" are direct quotes/use of wordings by Xi Jinping in his "explanation"

# <u>Principles</u>: compared to 2013, 'Third Plenum' uses eight evolved reform principles, shaping reform measures

### 01 Evolved "purpose" of China's reforms



- "Reform is necessary for China to gain competitive advantages in a situation with 100-year unseen changes"
- "A critical time to build China into a major power" (强国建设)
  - Key policy examples: innovation, macro governance, trade policy, etc.

### 05 New growth dynamics through reforms



- "High-quality development (高质量发展)"
- "New-quality productive forces" esp. disruptive technologies like AI, quantum, bio, etc.
  - Key policy examples: 'patient capital', tax system reform, coordinated/balanced regional development, etc.

### 02 Expectation management – to sustain reform determination



- "The reform and opening-up is a continuous process and there is no definitive end" (改革开放只有进行时, 没有完成时)
- "All party members should prioritize reforms"
  - Key policy examples: innovation, high-level opening-up, party system improvement

### 06 External pressure as driving force for reforms



- "Complicated international and domestic environment (纷繁复 杂的国际国内形势)"
- "Tech and industrial revolution" (科技与产业革命)
  - Key policy examples: technological self-reliance, trade risk monitoring, anti-foreign sanction, etc.

### 3 More systemic approach in reforms



- "The reform should be made in a way of system integration" (系 统集成)
  - Key policy examples: innovation, macro governance, coordinated urban-rural development, etc.

### Security interests pervasively shaping reforms



- "Coordinate high-quality development and high-level security" (统筹高质量发展与高水平安全)
- "National security system" (国家安全体系)
  - Key policy examples: macro governance, cross-boarder data transfer, state capital management, etc.

### 04 Policy coordination and effective implementation



- "Coordinate the policymaking (政策统筹协调)"
- "Pay more attention to results and effectiveness" (更加注重改革 实效)
  - Key policy examples: innovation, fertility support system, national security system, etc.

### More centralized party leadership in reforms



- "The party makes decisions related to all aspects of reforms" (党的领导贯穿改革的各方面全过程)
- Enhanced ideological education for party leadership in reforms
  - Key policy examples: law making, ideological work responsibility, social governance, etc.



# Key policy changes: compared to NPC 2024, 30 entirely new 'reform measures' across 8 reform areas identified

## 'Third Plenum' addresses key reform areas with select entirely new reform measures — as compared to NPC 2024

		Terraini delan ecces inc y rec	- as compared to the electricity new reform measures as compared to the electricity
_	CO	Socialist market economy	<ul> <li>Improve equal treatment between state-owned and private economy, esp. regarding access to factors of production, market access and legal protection</li> <li>Defined more SOE responsibilities in innovation, industrial upgrading and national security</li> </ul>
ırms	C	Innovation policy	<ul> <li>Expanding innovative talent supply, e.g. via promoting international knowledge exchange</li> <li>Effective policy coordination – vertically between central and local governments</li> <li>Ensuring financing of innovation, e.g. via foreign VC/PEs</li> </ul>
Economic reforms	C	Industrial policy	<ul> <li>Refined industrial upgrading blueprint: upgrade traditional industries (via standards), cultivate strategic emerging industries (via policy system), and build early leading position in future industries (via fundraising mechanism)</li> </ul>
Econ	TAX	Macro-economic governance	<ul> <li>Systemic policy design and effective policy coordination – horizontally among ministries</li> <li>Improve financial capability and granting more financial autonomy for local governments</li> </ul>
		Opening-up	<ul> <li>Proactive alignment (主动对接) with global economic standards</li> <li>Unilateral opening-up to least developed economies</li> <li>"Systemic trade policy making (贸易强国制度支撑和政策支持体系)"</li> </ul>
l and reforms		Urban-rural development and social security	<ul> <li>Further equal treatment to rural immigrants, esp. for access to public service based on long-term residency</li> <li>Measures to restore population growth, e.g. birth-giving subsidy and public childcare service</li> </ul>
Social and cultural refor		Media governance	More effective governance on all-media channels and (esp. online) public opinion
<b>Security</b> reforms		Coordinate development and security	<ul> <li>Ensuring China's security interest, mainly—supply-chain resilience, technological self-reliance, risk-responding mechanism for trade activities</li> <li>Special focus on holistically coordinating supply chain of strategic minerals</li> </ul>



# **Deep-dive 1**: in pursuit of China's goals, 'Third Plenum' vows to treat different ownership forms more equally

### Third Plenum reform priorities across three types of market entities

	State-owned enterprises	Privately-owned enterprises	Foreign-owned enterprises
Access to factors of production	• n/a	<ul> <li>Easier financing for POEs, e.g. lower borrowing cost</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ensure national treatment for FIEs regarding access to factors of production</li> </ul>
Market access	<ul> <li>Promote market-oriented reforms in competitive segments of sectors, e.g. in energy, railway, telecom and public utilities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Remove market access barriers for POEs to e.g. infrastructure construction and other types of large public projects</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Shorten FDI negative list</li> <li>Remove FDI restrictions in manufacturing sector</li> <li>Gradually open market of finance, telco, healthcare</li> </ul>
Legal protection	• n/a	<ul> <li>Private Economy         Promotion Law     </li> <li>Supervision on fee over-charging and overdue/late payments to POEs (by SOEs)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Build a market-oriented, rule-based, international business environment</li> <li>Ensure legal rights and interests of FIEs in China</li> </ul>
Governance	<ul> <li>More effective evaluation of SOE performance incl. how SOEs contribute to national strategic goals</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>POE credit evaluation</li> <li>Guide POEs to improve self-governance, enhance compliance and risk control</li> </ul>	• n/a
Function	<ul> <li>Direct state-owned capital to sectors of public interest, e.g. security and public service, plus to strategic emerging industries</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Allow POEs to lead major national S&amp;T projects</li> <li>Open public research resources and facilities to POEs</li> </ul>	Support FIE in cooperation along the supply chain


#### CMG assessment

- The 2024 reform plan symbolically gives up the long-lasting "main body position" (主体地位) of the public economy, which is a political signal that China wants to further raise the position of the private sector and increase reliance of GDP growth on private economy
- Equal treatment of all types of market entities stressed broadly regarding access to factors of production, fair competition, and legal protection; more measures to improve overall business environment can be expected
- By making equal treatment, China wants to take advantage of different market entities and promote synergies among them; SOEs, POEs and FIEs shall all be included in a unified framework to support China's overarching national interests, most importantly in areas of technological breakthroughs, industrial upgrading and supplychain resilience

# Deep-dive 2: 'Third Plenum' vows to deepen integration of industry-academic-research (产学研) value chain

	Talent cultivation	Basic research	Need identification	Applied research	Product/ tech R&D	<b>&gt;</b>	nmercial lication	Market feedback
Universities	<ul> <li>Targeted scientific talent cultivation</li> <li>General knowledge</li> </ul>	Increase the share     of <b>S&amp;T expenditure</b> on basic research,     ornerially subjects	Encourage research     with "high risk and     high value"	Give scientists     greater flexibility     and power to self-	Core reform efforts  Conduct joint researches, guided by practical needs of companies (企	• N/A	• N/	<b>′</b> A
Research institutes	• N/A	especially subjects with "urgent national needs"	<b>rigent diversification</b> of • Improve research 业主导的	业主导的产学研 深度融合)	• N/A	• N/	'A	
SOEs	• N/A	• Conduct " <b>original</b> Innovation" (原始创新)	<ul> <li>Emphasize research serving national strategic needs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Focus on forward-loc emerging industries</li> </ul>	oking, strategic, and (前瞻性战略性新兴产业)	but a	•	rom market success missions" (国有企业 )
POEs	• N/A	<ul> <li>Encourage capable Porcesearch projects</li> <li>Further open-up majinfrastr. (国家重大科</li> </ul>		Both R&D for the ma encouraging capable edge technologies	rket as well as POEs to develop <b>cutting-</b>		ly <b>market-oriented</b> roduct feedback	commercialization
FIEs	<ul> <li>N/A (no specific mentioning in industry-academic-research cooperation, regarding early-phase innovation)</li> <li>Expand the catalog of industries that encourage foreign investment and reasonably reduce the negative list for foreign investment access</li> <li>Improve FIE market access with "national/local treatment" (国民待遇)</li> </ul>							
Finance	• N/A	• N/A	Encourage more long	support for national projeg-term investment in early echnologies" (硬科技)		• N/A	• N	/A
International cooperation	<ul> <li>Encourage foreign high-level science and engineering universities to open campus in China</li> <li>Promote international S&amp;T exchanges, and encourage international S&amp;T organizations to establish offices in China</li> </ul>							

# **Deep-dive 3: Third Plenum previews emerging industrial blueprint focused on "new quality productive forces"**



# Xi at Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC)

"The industrial policy making shall concern both development and security needs of China"

"产业政策要发展和安全并举"

= significance

## **Top-level industrial policy efforts...**

#### Developing 'new-quality productive forces'

- Cultivate high-tech emerging industries
- Build early leading edges in future industries
- Upgrade traditional industries with new techs

#### Integration of real and digital economy

- Promote digitalization in manufacturing to raise efficiency and supply high-end products
- Develop a robust digital economy

#### Leveraging growth potential of service sector

- Accelerate standard setting of service provision
- Cultivate business services (生产性服务) and diversify consumer services (生活性服务)

#### **Building modernized infrastructure**

- Improve standard setting of new infrastructure construction e.g. digital, industrial, logistics
- Digitalization of traditional infrastructure

### ... key related policy enablers

#### New system of mobilizing national S&T resources

- Make disruptive tech innovation and tech breakthroughs with public facilities/programs
- Organize research activities in frontier areas

#### Talent cultivation and incentivization

- Expand supply of high-tech talents
- Improve evaluation of research outcome and incentivize S&T talents with higher income

#### Leverage market forces to support innovation

- Allow POEs to lead major S&T projects
- Promote commercialization of R&D outcome

#### Financial resource guarantee

- Fiscal guarantee for major S&T projects
- Ensure financing of tech innovation incl. via VC

### Opening-up

- Encourage setting-up of intl. S&T orgs/facilities
- Foster intl. innovation cooperation e.g. via BRI

# National security system

- Risk monitoring: supply chain, tech bottlenecks
- Technological self-reliance

#### Opening-up

• International supply-chain cooperation

### High-Quality Development



#### Enhancing supply-chain resilience and security

 Develop self-reliant and controllable supply chains, ensuring alternative supplies and storage

#### Enhancing data security

• Data governance incl. cross-border data transfer







# Calibration: 2024 presents the broadest reform package to date, dealing with all six structural transitions

Structural transitions	16th CC Third Plenum (2003)	18th CC Third Plenum (2013)	20 <sup>th</sup> CC Third Plenum (2024)
Economic transition and industrial upgrading	<ul><li>Enterprise-centered innovation system</li><li>Talent pool</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Innovation incentives, IP protection</li> <li>Gov support to S&amp;T development</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New-quality productive forces</li> <li>SSSR, climb industrial value chain</li> <li>Digitalization and decarbonization</li> <li>Growth of service sector</li> </ul>
Market-oriented reforms and market governance	<ul> <li>POE market access, property rights</li> <li>SOE reform, open monopolistic sectors</li> <li>Unified market, market of factors</li> <li>Economic legal framework</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Property rights</li><li>SOE reform esp. "mixed ownership"</li><li>"Modern market system"</li></ul>	High-level socialist market economy:     more equal public vs private economy,     unified market, factor liberalization,     improved governance, anti-monopoly
Economic globalization	<ul> <li>Institutional framework for opening-up</li> <li>Introduction of foreign tech and talents</li> <li>Outbound investment support</li> <li>Core: market- and institutional reforms</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Relaxing FDI restrictions</li><li>Free-trade zones</li><li>Expanding in-land opening-up</li></ul>	<ul> <li>High-level opening-up</li> <li>Alignment w/ global economic standards</li> <li>Improve business environment for FIEs</li> <li>Engage in global economic governance</li> </ul>
Social rebalancing	Fair and inclusive income distribution	<ul> <li>Transfer payment</li> <li>Urban-rural integration</li> <li>Well-structured income distribution</li> <li>Initial comprehensive reform</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Coordinated regional development</li> <li>New urbanization and rural rejuvenation</li> <li>"Common Prosperity"</li> <li>New development model of real estate</li> </ul>
'Domestic demand system'	• N/A	• N/A	<ul> <li>Domestic demand expansion</li> <li>Long-term pro-consumption</li> <li>Public investment as lever</li> <li>Fertility support system</li> </ul>
Economic security	• N/A	• N/A	<ul> <li>Coordinate development and security</li> <li>Technological self-reliance</li> <li>Supply-chain resilience</li> </ul>
Longer term transitions T	rade-off / rebalancing processes		Full-scale reform efforts
Longer-term transitions T	rude-ojj / rebuidheing processes		Size of harvey ball indicates progress since 2013

# Agenda

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	Discussion / O&A	20'



# **Conceptualization**: development and security dialectically linked – heightened risk perception affecting both

# Risks (风险)



# Development (发展)

- "Basic party line" (1978/13<sup>th</sup> PC, Deng)
- "Scientific Outlook on Development" (2003, Hu)
- "High-Quality-Development" (2017, Xi)

"Development is guarantee for security"



"Security is prerequisite of development"



# Security (安全)

- Single security concepts
- "Holistic view of national security" (19th PC)
- "Coordinate development & security" (14FYP)




# 16 concepts under the 'Holistic View of National Security' – eight more relevant to foreign business

Security concepts		Emergence	FIE relevance	Security concepts		Emergence	FIE relevance		
	Political Security	1949	•		Ecological Security	<b>2000</b> s			
Traditional	Military Security	1949	•		Overseas Interests	2000s			
T T	Territory Security*	1949	•		Societal Security	2014	•		
	Resource Security	1949	•	Non-traditional	Technology Security	2014	•		
nal	Nuclear Security	1949	•		Economic Security	2014			
-traditional	Cultural Security	early 2000s	•		Outer Space Security	2018	0		
Non	Biological Security	2002 (SARS)			Deep Sea Security	2018	$\circ$		
	Cyber Security	2000s	•		Polar Security	2018	0		
		= Security concepts most relevant to business = Introduced in the Xi era							

# **Evolving perception**: risk perception and security needs have consistently risen during past three decades

## Mentions of "risk" (风险) and "security" (安全) in China's Five-Year Plans since the 9th FYP



# <u>'Toolbox'</u>: 6 key policy measure types for China to management risk and enhance economic security

Managed "risk"	Self-reliance 自立自强/自主可控 Import dependencies	Explose tech breakthroughs 攻关/突破 China's tech bottlenecks	Securing external supply  Import dependencies	"Trump cards" "杀手锏" Western tech decoupling	Sectoral governance (bio/cyber)  Weaponisation or abuse of sensitive tech	Retaliatory capacity  Inability to retaliate and deter
Scope	Critical industrial input	Tech	Resources (energy, food, critical minerals)	Tech (mature vs emerging strategic tech)	Tech	Foreign influence and pressure
De-risking approach	Supply chain security via "onshoring"	Accelerated indigenous catching-up	Import diversification and going out	Retain/create foreign dependencies on China	Market governance	Legal deterrence toolbox
Exemplified measures	<ul> <li>'Hidden champions'</li> <li>Supply-chain ecosystem</li> <li>Storage capacity</li> </ul>	New system for mobilizing resources nationwide e.g. special R&D projects	<ul> <li>Trade policy</li> <li>International supply-chain cooperation e.g. via BRI</li> <li>SOE-led FDI for e.g. critical minerals</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mature tech:         HSR, new         energy,         communication         equipment</li> <li>Emerging:         quantum, AI,         gene tech</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Data         regulation esp.         cross-border         data transfer</li> <li>Restricting         FIEs in         sensitive tech         areas e.g. bio</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Export Control         Law</li> <li>Anti-Foreign         Sanctions law</li> <li>Foreign         Relations Law</li> <li>Anti-Espionage         Law</li> </ul>





# 'Self-reliance' example: Guangzhou Municipality as one of 12 pilot cities to build shorter supply chains

Policy implementation / measure type: "supply chain ecosystem pilot program" (31st Oct. 2022)



全国首批! 广州入选国家产业链供应链生态体系建设试点城市

近日、工业和信息化部公布正式确定国家首批产业链供应链生态体系建设试占城市、广州等12个城市入选。

据工业和信息化部公布,开展产业链供应链生态体系建设试点,是提升产业链供应链创新能力、增强其稳定性和竞争力的重要举措。试点城市要通过机制创新、要素集聚、平台搭建、数智赋能和政策支持,推动区域产业链供应链生态体系迭代升级,形成龙头企业、配套企业、高等院校、科研院所、第三方平台、金融机构等协同联动、竞合共生的生态发展格局。通过试点、探索形成"遴选试点—加强指导—资源倾斜—滚动评估—持续优化—推广应用"的工作

"First batch nationwide! Guangzhou has been selected as a pilot city for the construction of a national industrial and supply chain ecosystem"

## **Exemplary** measures

"Forming an ecological development pattern of **collaborative and symbiotic cooperation** among leading enterprises, supporting enterprises, higher education institutions, research institutes, third-party platforms, financial institutions, etc"

形成龙头企业、配套企业、高等院校、科研院所、第三方平台、金融机构等协同联动、竞合共生的生态发展格局

"Deeply implement a dual chain "chain leader system" with **14** local officials as the "chain leaders" and 118 leading enterprises as the "chain leaders""

深入实施以14位市领导为"链长"和以118家龙头企业为"链主"的双链式"链长制"





# 'Self-reliance' example: policy system to make high-tech SMEs thrive and fill critical supply chain gaps

#### In the pyramidal system, SME certificates last three years



- Experience and market position: +10 years' experience in manufacturing sector, market share of single-product among top 3 globally
- <u>Economic performance:</u> avg. annual revenue 400 M RMB
- <u>Innovation:</u> high-level R&D institution and core IPR
- Preference is given to previous holders of "Little Giants" certificate

#### 2 Little giants (专精特新"小巨人"企业)

- Experience and market position: SME status (<1000 employees/annual revenue <400 M RMB), >3 yrs experience in a specific market, products are in key manufacturing industries\*
- Economic performance: leading products >10% domestic market share, 5% growth last 2 years; asset liability ratio <70%
- Innovation: high R&D intensity, possess IPR



#### Specialized SMEs (专精特新中小企业)


- Experience and market position: >2
  years engagement in a niche market
- Economic performance: income >10 M RMB, or if <10 M RMB, new equity >20 M RMB in past 2 years
- Innovation: R&D investment >1 M RMB
- Relevant score in certain evaluation indicators: e.g. relevant sector, R&D intensity, possess IPR

#### Innovative SMEs (创新型中小企业)

Reach relevant score in evaluation indicators: 1) Number of IPRs of leading product (1 or more Class IP IPR) 2) >5% ratio of R&D expenses cf. total revenue 3) > 15% growth rate of main business income 4) <15% asset-liability ratio 5) Product belongs to "strategic" sectors e.g. IT, high-end equipment manufacturing, NEVs</p>



### Sector view: China's industrial ambitions vs. national security concerns across 41 Sector Five-Year-Plans





### Outlook: finetuning of China's risk management approach?

#### **Nuancing risk management policy**

Central Economic Work Conference, Dec 2023

- "Dynamic balance" [动态平衡] is needed in coordinating development and security
- … with goal to ensure "positive interaction"
  [良性互动] between "high-quality
  development" [高质量发展] and "highlevel security" [高水平安全]"

#### Innovating 'security thinking'



Two People's Daily Op-eds on high-quality development and high-level security, Feb 2024

- Innovation of security strategy, set borders [边界] and bottom-line [底线] of security thinking
- Avert pursuit of security by sacrificing development interest (不能因为求安全而 裹足不前)

#### Development/growth re-emphasized




National People's Congress, March 2024

- "Under premise of ensuring bottom line of security [坚守安全底线的前提下], devote more efforts to development [更多为发展 想办法] and give more support to business"
- ... and "coordinate high-quality development and high-level security, effectively boosting economic vitality [切实增强经济活力]"



## Synoptic view: all trade blocs adopt security-driven policies, China with strongest focus on supply chain security



Pre-empt China + global (order) leadership



**Key features** 

Industrial-leadership + self-reliance

Diversify trade + (open) strategic autonomy

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# Industrial policy blueprint with 6 pillars to guide China's chemicals sector under High-Quality Development

#### 6 policy pillars to strengthen China's chemical industry...

#### ...with many key policies published since 14th FYP



#### **Industrial Upgrading**

- Improve overall **competitiveness** and sustainability
- Phase out outdated production capacities

- MIIT, NDRC, et al. (2022): Guiding Opinions on High-quality Dev. of Petrochemical and Chemical Industry 14<sup>th</sup> FYP
- MIIT, NDRC, et al. (2023): Work Plan for Stable Growth of Petrochemical and Chemical Industry

Cf. next slide



#### **Green Development**

- Reduce pollution and improve energy efficiency
- Carbon peak by 2030, carbon neutral by 2060

- NDRC, NEA (2024): Action Plan for Low-carbon Transformation of Coal Power (24-27)
- MIIT (2021): 14<sup>th</sup> FYP Industrial Green Development Plan
- NDRC, NEA, et al. (2021): 14<sup>th</sup> FYP Renewable Energy Devel.



#### **Production Safety**

 Strengthen safety management systems to reduce accidents and enhance safety

- MEM (2023): Chemical Ind. Park Safety Mgmt. Guidelines
- MEM (2022): 14<sup>th</sup> FYP Hazardous Chemical Safety Production Planning



#### **Technological Innovation**

- **Tech breakthrough** of new materials / products
- Encourage R&D and independent innovation

- MIIT, NDRC, et al. (2024): *Plan for Innovation and Dev. of Fine Chemical Industry* (2024-2027)
- MIIT, NDRC, et al. (2024): Work Plan for Digital Transform. of Raw Materials Industry (2024-2026)



#### **Regional and Spatial Development**

 Encourage to expand into resource-rich Central and Western China to optimize industry layout

- CCCCP, SC (2021): Opinions on Promoting High-quality Development in Central China in the New Era
- NDRC (2023): Measures for Industrial Transfer Pilot Zones



#### **International Cooperation & Security**

- Promote Chinese chemical companies' going-out
- Ensure security in raw materials, energy and tech

- NDRC (2022): Guiding Opinions on Promoting High-Quality Dev. of the Belt and Road Initiative
- NDRC, NEA (2022): 14<sup>th</sup> FYP Modern Energy System Planning



## **Deep-dive**: clear targets and measures to push for decarbonization and circularity in China's chemical sector

#### Policies\* set clear targets for chemical decarbonization / circularity...

# Reduce emission

#### Lower carbon and pollution emission

- By 2025, carbon emission per industrial value-add 18% lower than 2020
- By 2025, VOCs emission reduces by 10%+ compared to 2020
- By 2025, emission intensity of major pollutant (e.g., SO<sub>2</sub>) 10% lower



# Improve efficiency

#### Improve energy efficiency

 By 2025, energy consumption per industrial value-add to reduce by 13.5% compared to 2020, and water consumption per industrial valueadd reduces by 16% compared to 2020



Promote recycling

#### Push for better recycling

- By 2025, comprehensive utilization rate of <u>bulk industrial solid waste</u> (e.g., coal gangue, fly ash, chemical gypsum, etc.) reaches 57%
- By 2025, recycling of major renewable resources reaches 480 M tons



# Clean energy

#### Switch to lower carbon inputs

- By 2025, green and environmental protection industry total output reaches 11 trillion RMB (~1.5 trillion USD)
- Promote green hydrogen as substitution and reduce fossil utilization

#### ... with support measures to help achieve these targets

# Support green tech innovation

- Encourage **R&D** in green tech, particularly in **green hydrogen**, **carbon capture**, green transformation via **digital tech**, etc.
- Develop biochemical industries and promote biomass utilization and biorefining
- Set-up national-/provincial-level green chemical research labs

# Carbon management

- Improve and expand coverage of **National Carbon Emissions Trading Market**, implemented since 2021
- Standardize Renewable Energy Green Power Certificate
- Promote electrification transformation and clean energy usage
- Strengthen supervision of high energy consumption companies

# Set up pilots

- **Certification** of national-/provincial-level green processes, green products, green factories, green supply chains, green parks, etc.
- Establish **demonstration zones**, e.g., modern coal chemical industry demonstration zones and green and smart zones

# Green finance support

- Provide green credits for companies' green transformation
- Various tax exemptions and land support for companies in pollution control, energy and water saving projects, wind and solar power projects, companies in batteries/new energy, etc.
- Encourage investment in environmental equipment, e.g., via governmental subsidies

# Agenda

Broader policy context: 14 <sup>th</sup> Five-Year-Plan (2021-2025) as "strategic shift"  Evolving industrial policy factors for FIEs in China's business environment  20 <sup>th</sup> CC 'Third Plenum' (July 2024)  China's "de-risking"  Industrial policy blueprint for chemicals sector under 'High-Quality Development'  How foreign chemical MNCs in China respond to evolved environment	20
<ul> <li>Evolving industrial policy factors for FIEs in China's business environment</li> <li>20<sup>th</sup> CC 'Third Plenum' (July 2024)</li> <li>China's "de-risking"</li> </ul>	5
Broader policy context: 14" Five-Year-Plan (2021-2025) as "strategic shift"	25
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## Select practices as observed among foreign chemical MNCs in China, responding to evolved environment



#### China/Asia footprint

- Double down on China and investing for deeper local capacities
- "In China, for global" supplying Asian markets, plus Australia and Europe (less to US)
- Parallel investments across Asia, e.g., KR, JP, IN, SG



#### **Product development**

- Expanding local product portfolio via M&A, inhouse R&D, JVs or joint research with local universities
- Actively researching green technologies in China, e.g., carbon capture



#### **Marketing and PGA**

- Explicit messaging on localization efforts and long-term commitment to China
- Refining PGA function



#### "De-risking" practices

- Supply chain auditing
- Non-China supply backups/alternatives
- Ringfencing of China operations (e.g. data)
- Selective business with esp. SOEs (dual-use, Xinjiang footprint)
- APAC HQ moved outside of China
- Closer HQ-subsidiary communication



# Agenda

	Discussion / O&A	<b>2</b> 0,
3	How foreign chemical MNCs in China respond to evolved environment	5′
2	<ul> <li>Evolving industrial policy factors for FIEs in China's business environment</li> <li>20<sup>th</sup> CC 'Third Plenum' (July 2024)</li> <li>China's "de-risking"</li> <li>Industrial policy blueprint for chemicals sector under 'High-Quality Development'</li> </ul>	25′
1	Broader policy context: 14th Five-Year-Plan (2021-2025) as "strategic shift"	5′



### **Key conclusions**

- 'Third Plenum' focuses on implementation and effectiveness
  - 30 new reform measures identified e.g. in industrial policy, innovation policy or socialist market economy system
- China's "de-risking" is a top-level policy since the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year-Plan (2021-2025)
  - Six measure types self-reliance with biggest impact on foreign business, e.g. driving localization and local content requirements
- Industrial policy blueprint for chemical sector in China with six pillars
  - Industrial upgrading, green development, production safety, innovation, regional/spatial development and international cooperation
  - On green development: clear targets and measures to push for decarbonization and circularity in China's chemical sector



# **Appendix**



# Air Liquide: double down on CN investments with business "density", and enjoy resilient growth in 2023 / 2024

### **Detailed practices per selected firm** Lenses

1 HQ-CN	CN management localization	• China President & CEO is not local, and usually global rotations after a few years, but most management are local Chinese; promote diversity of employees and mid-level managers, e.g., European engineers working in various cities in China	
branch	CN managers in global board/ExCo	• N/A (General Secretary of the Group and member of the Group ExCo, Francois Abrial, overseas China business plus APAC)	
interaction	HQ's perception of China	• Resilience & growing, "we have enjoyed high single digit growth for 2023, and we do expect the same trend to continue in 2024 – though this may sound counterintuitive to what others announced or in the Press" Air Liquide CEO François Jackow	
China/Asia footprint	China capacity building in recent years (investment, R&D, production) vs. in ASEAN, JP, KR and IN	<ul> <li>Doubling down on investments in mainland China, e.g., \$60 M in Tianjin, \$200 M in Shanghai, \$100 M in Zhangjiagang, etc.</li> <li>Also announced expanding investments in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, each project between \$50 M - \$300 M</li> <li>Financial derisking via local financing – take loans from banks in China to reduce exchange risks and cross-border transfers</li> </ul>	
3	Client segment (low, mid, premium)	Broad coverage as Group strategy for resilience, 120+ plants in CN serving broad segments, clients range from craftsmen to large SOEs/high-tech national projects; not only in developed Eastern China, but also in less developed Western China	
Product development	Product portfolio (vertical and horizontal expansion)	<ul> <li>Expand the product portfolio in China, e.g., launched Air Liquide's first biomethane production unit in China in 2023</li> <li>Set up JVs with companies along value chain, e.g., new JV with a Sinopec subsidiary, MoU with Sinopec Group in hydrogen</li> </ul>	
	Product pilots for decarbonization/ circular economy	Develop new solutions in hydrogen – aim to develop renewable hydrogen by 2030, with PEM water electrolysis technology	
4	General marketing	• Demonstrate a strong long-term commitment to China in marketing, but also keep its French/international identity, e.g., most Air Liquide's WeChat posts are bilingual in Chinese and English, it also has international business news besides China	
Marketing and PGA	Strategic marketing	• Emphasize local production and has gained access to SOEs and labs in sensitive industries, e.g., energy and semiconductor	
u.i.u i G/1	PGA	<ul> <li>CN Presidents awarded as "investment ambassadors" (招商大使), "int. entrepreneur consultant" by several CN local gov.</li> <li>High-level PGA as Xi Jinping and Emmanuel Macron were both present at Sinopec and Air Liquide MoU signing ceremony</li> </ul>	
5	Direct/distributors/ecommerce	• Most industrial clients via direct sales; for healthcare/beauty products, e.g., SEPPIC under Air Liquide, more via distributors	
Sales channels	Exports from China	"In China, for global", Air Liquide and its JVs exports from China to Korea, Australia, Canada and several countries in Europe	
	China desk overseas	• N/A	
6 Global	Role of CN suppliers globally	Air Liquide minimizes physical distances of the 120+ plants across China and their suppliers, with 1800+ local CN suppliers	
supply chain	Supply chain derisking	in materials & equipment, many become not only suppliers but also strategic partners; N/A share of CN suppliers in	

# <u>Arkema</u>: continued major investment in China to expand capacity and product range, driven by robust growth

Lenses		Detailed practices per selected firm	
1 HQ-CN	CN management localization	President of Greater China is a Chinese local executive, promoted in 2021 to succeed the previous president of French nationality; CN managers serve multiple APAC divisions, e.g., APAC President of Fluorochemicals, Marketing Manager	
branch	CN managers in global board/ExCo	N/A, most of the Board are French	
interaction	HQ's perception of China	<ul> <li>Rapidly-expanding &amp; growing investment, "China's green transformation and high level of openness greatly enhance our confidence in China, contributing to more investments and fulfillment of our long-term commitment to Chinese market"</li> </ul>	
China/Asia footprint	China capacity building in recent years (investment, R&D, production) vs. in ASEAN, JP, KR and IN	<ul> <li>Massive "doubling down" strategy on China, with new investments to expand capacity and product innovation, e.g., Peroxide plant expanded by 1.5 times, Tens of millions EUR in Changshu production base, €48M in Shanghai for R&amp;D</li> <li>Multiple investment in Korea and India, e.g., Acquisition of PIAM (Korea) with €393 M, Double capacity of resins in India</li> </ul>	
3	Client segment (low, mid, premium)	Mid-to-high end, with innovative high-performance products offered to broad industries, ranging from national strategic industries to consumer goods sectors; also built long-term relationship with leading SOEs in high-tech industries	
Product development	Product portfolio (vertical and horizontal expansion)	<ul> <li>Product innovation by forming corporate alliance, e.g., ZEBRA founded to exploit recyclable wind turbines</li> <li>Collaborative platforms with downstream, e.g., Automotive platform with Tier1 &amp; OEMs creates high-performance polymers</li> <li>Expand product mix through acquisitions, e.g., Bostik for specialty adhesives, PMP Shanghai for engineering adhesive</li> </ul>	
	Product pilots for decarbonization/ circular economy	<ul> <li>Design recyclable products to promote sustainability, e.g., Elium® thermoplastic resin, Rilsan®Pebax®Advanced Bio-Circular</li> <li>Recycle materials from packages and integrate into its products, e.g., powder coating resin, to reduce carbon emission</li> </ul>	
Mouleating	General marketing	<ul> <li>Actively advocate its localization &amp; digitalization strategy aligned with China's development path, involve international news of the group on WeChat to publicize global vision</li> </ul>	
Marketing and PGA	Strategic marketing	• Strategic collaboration with companies to share resources in value chain, e.g., partner with Hyperion in fiber membranes	
	PGA	Interaction with local governments in project investment and future plan, praised by local gov. for economic contribution	
5	Direct/distributors/ecommerce	<ul> <li>An integration of direct sales and distributors for both online &amp; offline; establish a "Arkema+Distributors" business model on 1688 B2B ecommerce, attracting numerous distributors to join the online sales system</li> </ul>	
Sales channels	Exports from China	• Extensive export from China to other Asian countries, Europe and America, benefits from several export certificates, e.g., Certificate of Origin under RECP for Sartomer brings tariff concessions, with part of exports to Japan enjoying zero tariff	
	China desk overseas	• N/A	
6 Global	Role of CN suppliers globally	Remain committed to Chinese suppliers, especially value those with decarbonization actions and reward those who	
supply chain	Supply chain derisking	contribute to a resilient global supply chain	



# <u>DSM</u>: Deepening localization in China, as a strategic market and critical player in the global supply chain

#### Lenses

#### **Detailed practices per selected firm**

1 HQ-CN	CN management localization	<ul> <li>President of DSM China is CN, who's worked for a telecommunications multinational corporation for 19 years, succeeding the previous CN president; Leaders of multiple busiensss divisions in China are also localized</li> </ul>
branch	CN managers in global board/ExCo	N/A, the management board is fully Dutch, while supervisory board diversified in nationality within Europe
interaction	HQ's perception of China	<ul> <li>Thriving market and plentiful R&amp;D/talents, "Rapid growth in wellness sectors bolsters confidence in CN as a key strategic market and innovative center of global value chain", "Abundant R&amp;D resources accelerate commercialisation of products"</li> </ul>
2 China/Asia footprint	China capacity building in recent years (investment, R&D, production) vs. in ASEAN, JP, KR and IN	<ul> <li>Frequent investment to enlarge capacity in China, e.g., In 2020, seventh premix plant launched in Hunan &amp; increase stake in Zhongken to 100% to deepen R&amp;D in biogel; In 2022, capacity expansion of high-performance material in Jiangyin</li> <li>Separate out Animal Nutrition &amp; Health business due to downward vitamin price, closed 2 vitamin factories in China</li> <li>No recent major investment in other Asian countries</li> </ul>
3 Product	Client segment (low, mid, premium)	• The core product is food & nutrition solutions to customers of full lifecycle, e.g., Addressing swallowing difficulties among the elderly; Premium incl. personal care products for young people, and sustainable material for biotech, pharma industry • _ Broad geographic cover that covers underdeveloped regions, e.g., nutrition plan for poor, animal feed sold in rural areas
development	Product portfolio (vertical and horizontal expansion)	<ul> <li>Product innovation via industrial cooperation, e.g., R&amp;D with home décor company to provide high-end customized coating</li> <li>Multiple acquisitions to expand product scope, e.g., pectin/biogel in hydrophilic colloid, polymer backplane in solar</li> </ul>
	Product pilots for decarbonization/ circular economy	<ul> <li>Initiate recyclable products in numerous industries to reduce carbon footprint, e.g., recyclable ocean plastic on Ford's cars, feed enzymes in farming, 100% biodegradable ingredients in fragrance, additives to reduce methane in ruminants</li> </ul>
4	General marketing	• Actively respond to China's policies and drive achievement of strategic goals, e.g., "Healthy China 2030", "Dual Circulation"
Marketing and PGA	Strategic marketing	<ul> <li>Market exploration with local companies across industries, e.g., solar, agriculture, diary, fermentation, healthcare, beauty</li> <li>Strategic partner with digital platforms to expand user pool, e.g., B2C platform Taobao/Tianmao, Health platform JD Health</li> </ul>
	PGA	Dialogue with previous Chinese prime minister Keqiang Li in WEF 2016 and interview with CCTV News
5 Sales	Direct/distributors/ecommerce	<ul> <li>Integrated sale network combining direct sales and distributors, establishing a network across South, North, Central China</li> <li>Register official stores on B2B platform Alibaba 1688, developing new clients with its mature digital commerce ecosystem</li> <li>Enter lower-tier market through Rural Taobao platform, distributing feeds to countries and villages of China</li> </ul>
channels	Exports from China	• "In China, for global", many world innovations originated from China are widely exported, e.g., Ambient yogurt attracts clients in Southeast Asia to reduce cold chain reliance, global R&D center of hydrocolloid business in China aims for globe
	China desk overseas	• N/A
Global	Role of CN suppliers globally	Establish deep collaboration with Chinese suppliers, in order to create a resilient and efficient global supply chain
supply chain	Supply chain derisking	<ul> <li>Annual report mentions global mitigation of geopolitical risks in global supply chains through continuous monitoring, without specifically mentioning China</li> </ul>

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